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1. Introduction
In a treatise on methods of applied ethics, Abraham Edel, Elizabeth Flower,
and Finbarr O’Connor distinguish between three traditional families of terms,
“the family of right and wrong, duty and moral law, rights and responsi-
bilities; the family of good and bad; and the family of virtues and vices.”1
They argue that “the formulation of an ethical question is choosing among
ways in which it may explored. And it is turning to some rather than other
of the resources that the history of ethical theory offers in its treatment of
ethical concepts.”2 Under the inspiration of pragmatism, they recommend a
pluralistic approach. “Instead of urging a choice among competing theories,
we suggest building up an inventory of resources from the theoretical reser-
voir, with a clear understanding of which can be invoked from what kind
of purposes.”3 They maintain that ethical theories can be utilized to resolve
practical problems without unifying concepts into a single system.
Unfortunately, attempts by philosophers to resolve practical issues of great
concern to the public such as abortion, physician assisted suicide, our oblig-
ations to nature and future generations, and capital punishment have resulted
in stalemates among members of the same schools of thought and more in-
tractably among members of different schools. Unification of theory seems
mandatory if we ever hope to break the stalemates and approach a consensus
on how to solve practical problems.
Suppose then, contrary to the counsel of Edel, Flower and O’Connor, we
undertake to determine which of the three popular approaches to ethical the-
ory is correct and to reduce the concepts of the others to it. We might be able
to show that a theory of virtue is a department or application of a theory of the
right or a theory of the good, as many modern ethical theorists have argued.
We also might find virtue ethics to be fundamental and reduce the other fami-
lies of concepts to it. A few contemporary moralists assert that it is time to try
this route. Prominent among them is Michael Slote, who argues in two recent
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books that the family of virtue concepts is irreducible to either or both the
other two families.4 He anticipates that the theory of virtue will evolve into
a “free-standing” ethic rather than remain a “supplement to common-sense,
Kantian, utilitarian, or other forms of ethics and moral philosophy.”5
Slote and Roger Crisp sketch the program for such an ethic in the in-
troduction to their anthology devoted to virtue ethics. They cite Elizabeth
Anscombe to the effect that the notion of obligation makes no sense if we
do not assume a lawgiver; and they declare: “Now that many of us no longer
believe in God, our only route to providing a foundation for ethics is in the
notion of virtue, understood independently from obligation as part of human
flourishing.”6 With the concept of obligation go both utilitarian and Kantian
ethics:
How, then, is a virtue ethicist to carve out his or her own niche? It
must be by providing an account of ultimate moral reasons which not
only is neither utilitarian nor Kantian, but makes essential reference to
the rationality of virtue itself. . . . The notions of virtue . . . are more
basic than the notions at the heart of utilitarian and Kantian theory. They
may even replace some of these notions, including perhaps “obligation”
itself. The virtue ethicist at least does not need such language. Cer-
tainly, it is characteristic of modern virtue ethics that it puts primary
emphasis on aretaic or virtue-centred concepts rather than deontic or
obligation-centered concepts.7
In his treatment of virtue, Slote dismisses duty altogether, so there is no ques-
tion of reducing virtue to the family of duty concepts. In Goods and Virtues
he defines “virtue” as any admirable human trait and argues that many traits
are admirable on other than moral grounds. In From Morality to Virtue, he
argues that an account of the good life should drop all reference to what is
moral, leaving as basic concepts only the admirable, nonmoral virtues, and
the desirable, personal goods. He ends From Morality to Virtue by asking
whether all admirable traits redound to the benefit of their possessor and are
admirable for that reason alone. This is the question of whether or not virtues
can be reduced to qualities that promote personal goods. He anticipates that
the answer will be negative. He believes that an adequate treatment of virtue
will require an independent virtue ethics in contrast to the usual treatments of
virtue that are mere supplements to other ethical theories. In his most recent
essay, Slote refers to his approach as “agent-based” which “treats the moral or
ethical status of acts as entirely derivative from independent or fundamental
aretaic (as opposed to deontic) ethical characterizations of motives, character
traits, or individuals.”8
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While Slote is right in thinking that ethical theorists should devote more
attention to the virtues, he is wrong in thinking that it is time to develop a
free-standing virtue ethic. It is never time to attempt the impossible. I shall
not attempt to show the impossibility, but I will point out obstacles to the way
Slote tries to surmount it. In both of his books, Slote appeals to common-
sense intuitions to justify his claims, but he does not explain what he means
by either “intuition” or “common sense.” I will examine the appeal to throw
light on the proper role of moral experience in the justification of theoretical
claims. In the process, I will make some headway toward showing that a
virtue ethic cannot stand alone; it needs a plausible theory of human nature
for its base, and norms of right conduct based on concepts of the right or good
independent of good character to hold it steady.
Some preliminary remarks on the probative use of common-sense will set
the stage for the analysis. It is one thing to use common sense in the decisions
of practical life and another to use it to justify theoretical claims. In practical
life, common sense is conceived to consist in sound judgment in dealing with
concrete situations. This is not a matter of abstract theoretical knowledge.
Though equipped with the most sophisticated theories, a person may not be
able to make wise decisions or even sound recommendations for the solution
of practical problems. People who know a great deal, but act foolishly, lack
common sense in the practical sense of the term.
A common-sense philosopher, in contrast, uses common sense as a source
of the content for the theories she constructs. To assess this approach to
theory, we need to consider the proper role of theorizing in practical life and
whether this affects its content. What will theory be about if it aspires to guide
practical decisions? What will it be about if it shuns this responsibility? In
answering these questions, we may decide that theorizing should or can only
rationalize what some group of people agree about on the basis of shared in-
tuitions. Ethical theory then will become an articulation of common sense or
what is called ordinary morality. Alternatively, we may decide common sense
needs revision in view of its incoherences and errors. Theory then becomes a
formulation of ideals beyond common practices, assumptions, and attitudes.
It becomes a critic of common sense rather than its advocate.
Slote’s reliance on the deliverances of common sense is fundamental in
both the practical and theoretic sense. He apparently leaves his common
sense in place to guide his conduct, and he explicitly relies on its deliver-
ances as a foundation for his ethical theory. In this approach his utilization
of common sense is more fundamental than that of others who have been
labeled common-sense philosophers. To bring out the distinctive features of
Slote’s approach, I will contrast it to the approach of Aristotle, who is widely
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considered to speak for common sense and who also centers his analysis of
the good life on virtue.
The purpose of the contrast is not to defend Aristotle on all counts, but
to highlight lacunae in Slote’s approach. His failure to specify the view of
human nature, human society, and the human condition on which his argu-
ment can be based leaves it floating in air. Until he provides this sort of
theoretical framework, his two theses, that the project of developing an in-
dependent virtue ethic is viable and that such an ethic should be grounded in
the intuitions of common sense, cannot be convincing.
2. Aristotle
The notion of common sense is not to be found in Aristotle’s analytic reper-
tory. However, this does not preclude him from utilizing his own common
sense or appealing to that of others in constructing political and ethical the-
ories. Some observers assert that he bases his theories almost entirely on
common sense. Thus Bertrand Russell opines about the Nicomachean Ethics
that “the only doctrine in the book that is not mere common sense” is the
claim that contemplation is the best activity for man. He concludes that the
work “in spite of its fame, is lacking in intrinsic importance.”9 Edith Hamil-
ton maintains that Aristotle got his key concept of eudaimonia from popular
tradition: “ ‘The exercise of vital powers along lines of excellence in a life
affording them scope’ is an old Greek definition of happiness.”10 C. M. Bowra
agrees that Aristotle took over the ordinary Greek notion of happiness, though
he credits him with philosophical acumen in the way he develops it.11 H.D.F.
Kitto observes that while ordinary Greeks would not have admired the man
of great soul in the way Aristotle does, “making due allowance for philosoph-
ical thoroughness and abstraction, the picture is entirely Greek, exaggerated
though it is.”12
It is obvious that Aristotle assimilated many traditional notions of his so-
ciety in compiling his inventory of the virtues and developing his view of the
place of the virtues in the good life. Did he think that the fact that the notions
were age-old or that they were accepted by many Greeks was any reason to
believe that they were correct? The three passages upon which S. A. Grave
relies in categorizing Aristotle as the first major common-sense philosopher
fail to show that he does.13
In the first passage, Aristotle argues that his definition of happiness in-
corporates features that many people look for. He says: “Now some of these
views have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few persons;
and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken, but
rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most
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respects.”14 However, while Aristotle acknowledges that other people’s opin-
ions merit consideration, he clearly expects to go beyond their opinions and
stands ready to contradict any of them when the facts as he sees them require
him to do so.
In the second passage, Aristotle points out that everyone seeks pleasure
and he argues from this fact that pleasure cannot be bad as such. He explains:
Those who object that that at which all things aim is not necessarily
good are talking nonsense. For we say that that which everyone thinks
really is so; and the man who attacks this belief will hardly have anything
more credible to maintain instead. If it is senseless creatures that desire
the things in question, there might be something in what they say; but if
intelligent creatures do so as well, what sense can there be in this view?15
That intelligent creatures pursue pleasure, however, establishes very little.
People pursue radically different sorts of pleasure. Even though we can infer
from the universal opinion that pleasure is good that some pleasures are in-
deed good, our own experience reveals that many are bad. Aristotle concludes
that only cultivated persons are right about which pleasures are good. The
many are wrong.
In the third passage, Aristotle says:
About all these matters we must try to get conviction by arguments,
using the phenomena as evidence and illustration. It would be best that
all men should clearly concur with what we are going to say, but if that
is unattainable, then that all should in some way at least concur. And this
if converted they will do, for every man has some contribution to make
to the truth, and with this as a starting-point we must give some sort of
proof about these matters.16
Here “phenomena” refers to what seems to be true to many people and hence
what serves as the basis for common beliefs. In the passage, Aristotle does
cite common beliefs as evidence for the truth of his views. As far as I know,
this is the only place where he does and the context suggests that this is not
his point. Instead he uses common beliefs to get his analysis started, and he
recognizes that he must add proofs based on objective facts to reach reliable
conclusions. Moreover, the passage follows a statement to the effect that our
primary aim in practical reasoning is to be virtuous rather than to know what
virtue is. This suggests that his motive for pointing out the connections of
his philosophical theory with common opinions is to make it persuasive and
guide or induce people to cultivate virtue.
330 JOHN KULTGEN
The remarks cited by Grave are thus insufficient to show that Aristotle se-
riously appeals to anything like common sense to prove his theoretical claims.
The uses to which he puts the opinions of others show that the philosopher
must decide whose opinions to consider even to ascertain what is the con-
tent of common opinions. After all, there are opinions and opinions. What is
Aristotle’s principle of selection? How does he decide which opinions to take
seriously?
Aristotle defines dialectical reasoning as the deduction of the implications
of “reputable” opinions. Opinions are reputable when they are accepted either
by everyone or the majority or the wise.17 In familiar passages dealing with
the best form of life he treats opinions of three groups as worth reporting,
but not necessarily worth adopting: (a) “the general run of men,” “the many,”
“most men,” “men of the most vulgar type” and “the mass of mankind”; (b)
“people of superior refinement and active disposition”; and (c) “the wise.”18
His basis for discriminating among these types lies in his conception of hu-
man nature. While the capacity for practical wisdom is innate in people qua
human and hence universal, it is found at radically different levels in different
individuals. It is at its lowest in natural slaves, who are capable of understand-
ing only that they ought to follow the commands of their masters. It is at a low
level in females, who need guidance from males. Only an elite group of adult
males, possibly restricted to those of Greek extraction, have the capacity at
the highest level.
Moreover, it is only the capacity to develop practical wisdom that is innate.
To operate, it must be cultivated, and in actual life it is cultivated to different
degrees. Hence, both the capacity for wisdom and the degree to which it is
actualized and utilized are shared unequally. Only relatively few people have
actual wisdom sufficient to make their opinions worthy of serious considera-
tion. Many of the opinions of the remainder are confused, ungrounded, or flat
wrong and should be contravened.
In consulting the opinions of people, Aristotle considers not only what
they say, but how they live, since their beliefs are expressed in their actions
as well as their words. Moreover, their actions affect their character and their
character affect their beliefs. Hence, their actions are a source of their beliefs
as well as evidence of what they believe.19 Only those who live well are in
a position to give testimony about how to live well. While it is conceivable
that “the many” in a good society such as Athens might be morally cultivated,
live well, and possess a high level of practical wisdom, Aristotle clearly did
not think that this was actually the case. He was skeptical about the wisdom
of many of the Greeks, and he was convinced that wisdom was almost totally
absent among barbarians. He certainly does not view wisdom as a sort of good
sense or sensibleness shared equally by all people. Thus he expresses a low
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opinion of adult Greek males in contrasting their beliefs with the beliefs of
the cultivated or the wise. He laments that self-love is given a bad name by the
fact that most men are ruled by their appetites and hence desire wealth, honor,
and pleasure excessively. He observes that they fall into error because they
are “forgetful,” “not good at drawing distinctions,” and “judge by externals,
since these are all they perceive.”20 As a consequence, their opinions count
for next to nothing. If what we mean by common sense is opinions shared
by the many, Aristotle not only does not appeal to common sense, he would
suspect that he was mistaken if he were to find himself agreeing with it.
For Aristotle, then, only the opinions of the cultivated and the wise are
worth serious attention. Sometimes we must look carefully to see that this
is what he is saying. For example, his remark at the start of the discussion
of continence and incontinence sounds as though he is appealing to a wider
group: “We must, as in all other cases, set the phenomena before us and, after
first discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the
reputable opinions about these affections or, failing this, of the greater number
and the most authoritative; for if we both resolve the difficulties and leave the
reputable opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently.”21
Aristotle’s reference to difficulties, puzzles, or problems is a tipoff that he is
referring to the way things appear to the cultivated and wise rather than to the
many. Difficulties arise from “an equality between contrary reasonings” on
questions.22 Hence, they arise only for people who reason. We do not look to
the many for much in the way of reasoning. In point of fact, the problems that
Aristotle considers are posed by such worthies as Socrates, Sophocles, the
Sophists, and the anonymous wise men who are authors of proverbs. More-
over, in solving problems raised by such people, Aristotle always appeals to
objective facts. The facts as he sees them refute some opinions of the wise
men, prove others, and rebut objections to them. It is not the fact that some of
Aristotle’s own views are shared by everyone or even by the wise that makes
them solutions of problems raised by contrary reasonings, but the fact that
they are grounded in objective reality as Aristotle sees it.
By “people of superior refinement” Aristotle appears to mean people who
have acquired moral virtue. This is indicated by his remark that only those
who “desire and act in accordance with a rational principle,” in contrast to the
young and the incontinent, can profit from lectures on ethics because they are
familiar with the beginning points for the inquiry in their own experience.23
Aristotle may mean by the experience of virtuous people something like
what many contemporary philosophers refer to as moral intuitions. Thus he
observes “up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate [from the
mean] before he becomes blameworthy is not easy to determine by reasoning,
any more than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things
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depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception.”24 The
perception must be that of a “man of practical wisdom.”25 In another place,
Aristotle says that highest good “is not evident except to the good man; for
wickedness perverts us and causes us to be deceived about the starting-points
of action. Therefore it is evident that it is impossible to be practically wise
without being good.” The reason for both remarks is that “this eye of the soul
acquires its formed state not without the aid of [moral] excellence.”26 What
Aristotle calls perception and the eye of the soul may be equated with what is
called intuition by later philosophers. His point is that there are intuitions
and intuitions, and only those of the properly qualified person count. He
generalizes: “the good man judges each class of things rightly, and in each
the truth appears to him. . . . For each state of character has its own ideas
of the noble and the pleasant, and perhaps the good man differs from others
most by seeing the truth in each class of things, being as it were the norm and
measure of them.”27
By “the wise” Aristotle means not only people who are practically wise
such as Solon and the other six Wise Men and spokesmen for traditional
wisdom such as the poets, Homer, Hesiod, Theognis, and Simonides, but
also people who are theoretically wise, who possess wisdom in the narrow
sense such as Anaxagoras and “friends who have introduced the Forms.”28
Aristotle seems to think that practical wisdom is a necessary condition for
the acquisition of theoretical wisdom, so theoretic wisdom may be taken as
a sign of practical wisdom. He therefore takes it as a point in favor of his
opinions when they harmonize with the opinions of the wise; but even here
he remarks that “while even such things carry some conviction, the truth in
practical matters is discerned from the facts of life; for these are the decisive
factor. We must therefore survey what we have already said, bringing it to the
test of the facts of life, and if it harmonizes with the facts we must accept
it, but if it clashes with them we must suppose it to be mere theory.”29 Thus
Aristotle is prepared to fly in the face of the opinions of the wise when this is
dictated by the facts.
No doubt when the cultivated and the wise agree with Aristotle, it rein-
forces his confidence in his own views; but this is a matter of psychology,
not logic. Does he think their views confirm his own? Nowhere does he say
so in a clear and unambiguous way, and in logic he should not. After all,
how does he know who is truly cultivated, who is practically wise, and hence
whose testimony is worth considering? It can only be because he himself has
acquired wisdom, looked at the facts, and drawn his own conclusions. He says
explicitly, “arguments about matters concerned with feelings and actions are
less reliable than facts: and so when they clash with the facts of perception,
they are despised, and discredit the truth as well.”30
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When Aristotle discusses dialectic in the sense of reasoning from rep-
utable opinions, he emphasizes that the art is necessary not only to win de-
bates with people who argue unfairly, but to teach people who are not yet
ready for science, since it builds upon what they already believe.31 He re-
marks that dialectic is also useful for “the study of the philosophical sciences”
and hence in his own work, because:
the ability to puzzle on both sides of a subject will make us detect more
easily the truth and error about the several points that arise. It has a
further use in relation to the principles used in the several sciences.
For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper
to the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles are primitive
in relation to everything else: it is through reputable opinions about them
that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly, or most
appropriately, to dialectic; for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein
lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.32
Aristotle’s point is that pitting opinions against one another is a heuristic
exercise necessary to reach the point where we can directly comprehend
the essences under study. The passage suggests that dialectic of itself proves
nothing.
Aristotle acknowledges that there is a good deal of truth in the opinions
of cultivated and especially of wise persons. The wise clearly include his
philosophical predecessors. He recognizes that it is his responsibility not
only to extract the truth in their opinions and winnow out their errors, but
to show how they came to see things as they did. In doing this, he appears
to have two aims. First, he wants to express his appreciation for their help in
articulating problems. Thus he remarks: “It is just that we should be grateful
not only to those whose opinions we may share, but also to those who have
expressed more superficial views; for these also contributed something, by
developing before us the powers of thought.”33 To get inquiry started, it is
essential to formulate problems. This focuses our attention on features of the
world where we will find answers. But then we must look at those features to
get the answers, and we must defend our answers by referring to facts, not by
appealing to common opinions.
Second, Aristotle wants to instill confidence in his views in his audience,
most of whom are politically active citizens. His aim is to improve practice by
teaching such people how to promote the good life for everyone in society.
His references to what others think are designed to persuade rather than to
demonstrate – to convince his audience, not to prove to them or to himself
that he is right.
334 JOHN KULTGEN
Of course, these two aims need not conflict. We may persuade by proving,
if we have the right audience. Aristotle notes that rational argument is just
the right tool of persuasion for scientific audiences. A person of integrity will
want to persuade such audiences by proving what is true and refuting what
is false. “Further, we must be able to employ persuasion, just as deduction
can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may
in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe
what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and
that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute
him.”34 Aristotle says nothing here about proving the truth by common opin-
ion. When he says shortly after, “persuasion is effected through the speech
itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the
persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question,” he might mean that
common opinions are probative as well as persuasive; but it is more prob-
able that he means that deducing what is true from common opinions is a
way of persuading people of truth without actually demonstrating or proving
that it is true.35 An exception would be cases where the common opinions
of an audience actually comprise scientific knowledge because the audience
is composed of scientists. Even then, it is the fact that the speaker knows
the truth of the premises and can demonstrate the conclusion that makes the
premises proper for use in persuading the audience, not the fact that scientific
or wise people know the premises.
Uncertainties about the interpretation of crucial passages means that we
cannot be quite sure that Aristotle finds no probative force in the opinions of
properly screened others. However, his main theme is that the opinions of the
wise are useful in guiding our attention to the parts of reality relevant to solv-
ing the puzzles that the opinions generate, but the opinions prove nothing in
themselves. Their value is heuristic, not probative. They jumpstart inquiry but
they do not bring it to resolution. It is moral experience that does this, and our
own moral experience in the last analysis. People’s experience or intuitions
are reliable only if they are persons of practical wisdom, and it takes criteria
provided by moral theory to tell whether they are. Moreover, intuitions are
useful for the confirmation of theoretical claims only when they are informed
by and then interpreted on the basis of a scientific theory of human nature and
the universe. This appears to be the correct way to interpret Aristotle, and in
any case I shall treat it as the Aristotelian approach in drawing the contrast to
the approach of Slote.
Let us observe, finally, that Aristotle does not propose a free standing
virtue-ethic. The virtues are indeed the focus of his attention, but he notes
that we cannot tell what the virtues are and whether they are present in a
person without a conception of right action or, as Aristotle would put it, a
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conception of just and noble action. Virtues are dispositions or potentialities
that are actualized in actions. The concept of virtue as a potentiality entails
the concept of the activity toward which it disposes the virtuous person. The
difference between virtue and vice is that virtue disposes us to good actions
and vice to bad ones. To distinguish virtue and vice we must have independent
criteria of good and bad actions. Aristotle makes this point in regard to natural
potentialities, but it applies equally to acquired potentialities.36 Moreover,
Aristotle observes, virtues are acquired by doing virtuous things: “we become
just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing
brave acts.”37 This implies that we are able to identify just, temperate, or
brave acts by criteria that do not include the fact that they are the actions of a
just, temperate, or brave person. Aristotle provides such a criterion. Virtuous
actions either themselves fall in the mean or are motivated by feelings that
fall in the mean. That such actions are ideal and hence that dispositions to
perform them are virtues rather than vices is due to human nature, the human
condition, and the kinds of behavior that fit a person to participate in the life
of the city. To the extent, then, that Aristotle relies on intuitions to tell him
what is good and noble, these are intuitions of things other than the presence
of virtues in a person. Furthermore, they are intuitions that can be understood
and validated only in the framework of a comprehensive philosophy.
3. Slote’s Approach to Ethics
Slote regularly appeals to common sense to justify his claims, but he nowhere
says that this is his ultimate or sole appeal. In the end he may be but another
Aristotelian who relies on common opinions to pose problems but not to
provide definitive solutions. The strongest evidence that he is a common-
sense philosopher in a deeper sense is negative: he fails to advance Aristotle’s
kinds of reasons for his normative judgments. He writes as if those reasons are
unnecessary or irrelevant. Thus he seldom refers to facts about the universe,
nature, human nature, or human society to justify his normative judgments.
The concordance of his theory with common sense appears to validate it in
his eyes. Certainly this is the ground on which he recommends his theories to
the reader.
To determine what Slote’s procedure entails, we will consider whose com-
mon sense it is that he consults, what content he ascribes to it, the ground for
its authority, and how he utilizes its content and authority in his theorizing.
To close in on how he thinks, let us begin with the way he talks. Common
sense in both ordinary and philosophical parlance refers to sense in contra-
distinction to nonsense. In regard to the question of whose sense is worth
consulting, Slote refers to “common,” “usual,” and “everyday” moral beliefs,
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“ordinary morality and thinking about morality” and “commonplace, but,
none the less for that, deeply held ideals.”38 He ultimately settles on “common
sense” as the name of this oracle. His terminology suggests beliefs shared by
all or most human beings. At one point he explicitly equates “common” with
“human.”39 He seems to be addressing his readers as ordinary human beings.
He includes himself in the group since he refers to our understanding, beliefs,
and ideals. He is just one ordinary human being talking to others.
At other points Slote seems to have in mind what is common among the
distinctive persons who compose his philosophical circle rather than what is
commonplace among everyone or ordinary persons. He refers to “our consid-
ered” opinions and judgments, “our most irrecusable ideas,” “deep-seated”
convictions and “deepest” understanding.40 At one point he refers to “reflec-
tive” common-sense ideas and calls his own approach critical common-sense
ethics and commonsensism.41 At these points his appeal seems not to be to
humanity at large, but to reflective persons comparable to Aristotle’s “the
cultivated and the wise.” Clearly he is a reflective person and he assumes that
individuals who wade through his books are reflective also.
Unfortunately Slote gives us no instructions as to when to consult the
intuitions of the person on the street and when to seek out reflective persons.
All of us are subject to the all-too-human tendency to solicit the advice and
accept the intuitions of people who agree with what we already think. If we
have no independent guidelines to tell us whose sense to consult, we cannot
assess their authority. Not knowing whom to consult, we cannot pin down the
judgments we are to accept on the say-so of common sense. This applies to
Slote, but it is unclear what credentials he uses to screen his consultants or
reference group.
An important indicator of the ethical opinions shared by a group of people
is the way they use key terms. In view of the uncertainties about Slote’s
reference group, we cannot be sure what he has in mind when he appeals
to ordinary or common usage. He may mean the way the common person
uses words, something which can be determined by consulting the dictionary.
He may mean the usages of his circle of friends, which he can only know by
social intercourse with them. He may mean the usages of ethical theorists,
which he can know by studying their works. I surmise that he relies upon the
last two types of usage. When he appeals to what we mean by key terms, he
is appealing to people like himself. Many of his readers and certainly most of
his non-readers may use the terms in other ways. We must wonder, therefore,
why we should assume that the usage of his reference group, whatever it is,
reflects the way things are.
To turn now to Slote’s use of the term “intuition,” throughout From Moral-
ity to Virtue he refers to “common-sense intuitionism,” “intuitionist morality,”
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“our everyday sense of what is intuitive or plausible,” “intuitive thinking,” and
“intuitive appreciation.” Without qualification, such phrases suggest the ex-
perience of everyone. However, Slote strikes the note of the critical intuition
of reflective persons when he refers to “what a morally sensitive and educated
adult will discern.”42 He clearly appeals to such persons when he refers to a
“deep seated intuition – an intuition that I have counted on most of us sharing”
to make a subtle point against a critic.43 Only a reflective reader schooled in
ethical theory is likely to appreciate such points.
As to the content of the common sense of whatever reference group he
consults, Slote feels free to pick and choose among its deliverances. This
raises the issue of how he decides which parts to trust. Etymologically, “in-
tuition” suggests a looking at and into what is directly before our gaze. The
term has been used in philosophy for both looking at particulars and looking
at universals. Slote has in mind looking at particulars. He announces that he
seeks to understand the phenomena of the moral life through our reactions to
examples, and he makes free use of the method of counter-examples.44 He
cites particular actions, states, or events that our intuitions assure us are good
or bad to show that our theoretical claims are mistaken when we assert the
opposite.
Slote maintains that he is using intuitively sorted examples and counter-
examples in the way an empirical scientist uses empirical observations to
verify and falsify rival theories. This suggests a use of theory to decide which
intuitions to accept as well as the reverse, the use of intuitions to decide what
theories to accept. It thus suggests an interplay between theory and intuition
comparable to that between theory and observation in science. Let us look
at the implications of this notion. Scientific inquiry is directed toward the
development of theories conceived as systems of logically interrelated general
propositions confirmed by observation.
Some philosophers, beginning with Aristotle himself, have claimed that
we intuit the truth of the primary propositions of perfected theories.45 I have
in mind the tradition that follows from Aristotle through the medievals to
Descartes and Kant and subsequent philosophers of rationalist inclination.
The philosophers in this tradition take the principles of metaphysics and
logic to be self-evident for the properly prepared mind and known a priori
in relation to the demonstrations based on or controlled by them.46 Intuition
is conceived to be a matter of direct intellectual vision of universals rather
than sensory apprehension of particulars.
Slote does not accept this model for ethical inquiry, for he does not main-
tain that all people or reflective and sensitive people intuit the truth of the
principles which ethical theory should articulate. While he refers to claims of
John Rawls about the primacy of justice and of W. D. Ross in his inventory
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of prima facie duties as “intuitive,” he does not maintain that the generalities
that he himself asserts are self-evident.47 He does not maintain that we have
direct insight into the truth of fundamental propositions that are necessary
to interpret the particulars of normative experience. Rather he appears to
maintain that his principles are inductively inferred from intuitions of cases.
This is a much more modest claim for intuition than that which is made in
so-called intuitionist moral theories.
Slote asserts that common-sense philosophers may ignore the practical
impact of their theories altogether, an attitude that he ascribes to many utili-
tarians.48 He follows this path himself. His aim is to create a structure of con-
cepts that will display the perfections of consistency, symmetry, uniformity,
economy, unity, and explanatory power and is reasonably well confirmed by
intuition. His concern is not to create a structure that will provide guidance
for practices in real life. In this regard, he clearly differs from Aristotle, who
says in the Nicomachean Ethics that “the present inquiry does not aim at
theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to
know what excellence is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our
inquiry would have been of no use)” and in general “the aim of studies about
action is surely not to study and know about each thing, but rather to act on
our knowledge.”49 Aristotle specifically seeks principles which the statesman
can implement through laws and customs of the city.
Even if the moral theorist does not aim at improving the practices of her
community but only utilizes its preconceptions, her thinking proceeds under
a different set of controls than that of the community. Ordinary people do
not verbalize all of their beliefs, much less systematize them. Even reflective
people supply a rationale for their actions only when challenged by some
critic or paradox or problematic claim. When they do, they come up with
some saw or adage such as “to thine own self be true” or “penny wise and
pound foolish” or some second-hand philosophical sentiment such as “do
unto others as you would have them do unto you” or “people have a right to
be treated with respect.” These rationales tend to be free-floating rather than
connected together in a comprehensive theoretical scheme, even an uncon-
scious or implicit one. Slote acknowledges this obvious fact when he asserts
that Kant’s views about a certain a question “seem quite close to those most of
us would naturally espouse if we were asked appropriate leading questions.”50
We do not espouse any views until we think about them, and questions that
cause us to think about them must come from some theoretical perspective
if our views are to lead us anywhere. Hence, we should not expect to find
a consistent and structured theory of ethics embedded in common sense or
common morality.
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Slote recognizes that much in common sense is ill-considered. He credits
utilitarianism with pointing out “the primitive, or at least intellectually unsat-
isfactory, thinking that lies . . . behind our ordinary moral thinking.”51 Most
persons wend their way through life with a set of opinions that are inarticu-
late, fragmentary, unsystematized, incomplete, and inconsistent. Their opin-
ions do not cover all of the situations of life and dictate contrary actions
in some of those they do. Such flaws are tolerable in life but not in theo-
ries. Hence, Slote says, once “we have seen where intuitions without system
lead us,” we realize that “we are going in any event to have to drop some
intuitions.”52
In From Morality to Virtue, Slote dismisses whole congeries of common-
sense intuitions, notably those that tell us of moral goods that are irreducible
to either virtues or personal goods and those that tell us that we are under
command, obligation, and judgment for what we do. Despite this cavalier
treatment of the intuitions of a great number of people, including prominent
philosophers who purport to speak for ordinary morality, he claims that his
views retain a firm grounding in common sense. Thus, he says he is advancing
“a virtue ethics that gives credence to intuition (when and where it doesn’t
lead to incoherence and paradox).”53
This completes the first part of this study, in which I have compared the
ways in which Aristotle and Michael Slote appeal to common sense in devel-
oping their respective theories of virtue. By common sense I have meant the
opinions and intuitions of the majority of human beings or some special refer-
ence group among them. We have seen that Aristotle uses common sense only
heuristically, as an aid in forming opinions of his own which he then checks
against the facts as the sees them. In contrast, Slote uses common sense pro-
batively. He takes it as confirmation and at points apparently as proof of the
correctness of his views when they accord with common sense. He thus is
a common-sense philosopher in a more profound sense than Aristotle. My
criticisms of his views have been designed to show that he is ill-advised to
be such. Aristotle’s guarded and limited use of common sense is the only use
that can be justified in ethical theory.
In the second part of this study, I will sketch the way in which intuitions
should be used in the development of an ethical theory. I shall continue to
focus on the theory of human virtue, but I shall argue that virtue as a prop-
erty of persons cannot be understood without adequate concepts of right as
a property of actions and good as a property of goals or consequences of
actions. Properties of a person are good and hence are virtues rather than
vices or neutral qualities because they dispose the person to do what is right
or achieve what is good, not because they can be seen intuitively or otherwise
to be good independently of the actions they motivate.
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